The implications of sufficiently large quantum computers for widely used public-key cryptography is well-documented and increasingly discussed by the security community. An April 2016 report by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), notably, calls out the need for new standards to replace cryptosystems based on integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems, which have been shown to be vulnerable to Shor's quantum algorithm for prime factorization. Specifically, widely used RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, and DSA cryptosystems will need to be replaced by post-quantum cryptography (PQC) alternatives (also known as quantum-resistant or quantum-safe cryptography). Failure to transition before sufficiently powerful quantum computers are realized will jeopardize the security of public key cryptosystems which are widely deployed within communication protocols, digital signing mechanisms, authentication frameworks, and more. To avoid this, NIST has actively led a PQC standardization effort since 2016, leveraging a large and international research community. The effort is expected to take six or more years to vet proposals, and to select alternatives that are believed to be secure against both quantum and classical computers. Meanwhile, many point out the urgency of transition due to the threat of "record now, exploit later" in which encrypted information assets are captured and stored today by an adversary for attack later when scaled quantum computers become available. While NIST's standardization effort aims to determine which PQC algorithms are robust enough to provide suitable alternatives for the threat of quantum computers, that effort does not address the problem of migration from today's widely deployed algorithms to future PQC alternatives across the diversity of computer systems that serve our society. Today, there are more than 4.1 billion Internet users, nearly 2 billion websites, and more than 3 trillion dollars in retail activity associated with the Internet. [5] Underlying this explosive digital transformation of the world as we know it are security and privacy technologies relying on public key cryptographic standards at many layers. The extensiveness of public key cryptography usage across the Internet means that an industry-wide migration to quantum safe cryptography standards (i.e., PQC) will be a massive undertaking, and one that is complicated by the layered complexity and heterogeneity of the worldwide compute infrastructure we operate. It will challenge, domain by domain, the fabric of our compute infrastructure and involve myriad organizations, from those who contribute widely used software and hardware components to the much larger number of operators who deploy and manage the constituent pieces of secure infrastructure globally. It is no wonder that prior history shows cryptographic migrations (e.g., 3DES to AES, MD5 to SHA1, SHA1 to SHA2, RSA to ECC) to take a decade or more before completion.
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Introduction: Why Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC)?
In this section, we discuss the implications of quantum computing for public key cryptography and motivations for research into the systems and issues surrounding deploying PQC in practice.
The Threat of Quantum Computing to Cryptography
Quantum computing, or the use of quantum mechanical phenomena to represent and manipulate information, promises to be a game-changing technology when fully realized at scale. Many problems that are now considered to be intractably complex for conventional computers, even the most powerful supercomputers, could become computable in minutes or seconds by harnessing the properties of quantum physics (e.g., entanglement, superposition) to represent information. Initial applications of quantum computing include the simulation of complex molecular systems in chemistry and material science, high-dimensional machine learning classification, and optimization problems over an extremely large space of possible solutions.
While quantum computing creates a whole new paradigm for solving complex computing problems, unfortunately it also enables a powerful new tool for attacking our existing cryptography algorithms. This makes it an important threat to Internet security as we know it today. To explain, public key (asymmetric) cryptography relies on trapdoor mathematical functions which allow the easy computation of a public key from a private key but make the computation of a private key from a public key (the inverse) computationally infeasible. Widely used trapdoor functions rely on the difficulty of integer factorization and elliptic curve variants of the discrete logarithm problem, both of which have no known solution for computing an inverse in polynomial time with conventional computing. In symmetric key cryptography, the security of a key shared between two parties relies on how difficult the random key is for an attacker to guess. If the value cannot be determined directly by cryptanalysis, the attacker may apply search methods to examine the space of possible keys looking for the correct value. But given a sufficiently large space of possible values, finding a key is computationally infeasible for the window of time during which the scheme is employed to protect data.
In 1994, Peter Shor showed how a quantum computer (QC), if it were to exist in a scalable form, could be used to perform integer factorization in polynomial time (polynomial in log N on integer size N) using modular exponentiation by repeated squaring and a quantum Fourier transform that he designed. [1] Shor's algorithm, as it is now called, has been shown to generalize to also solve the discrete logarithm and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problems in polynomial time. For an attacker with a sufficiently large QC, this effectively "breaks" the security of key trapdoor functions that our widely used public key infrastructure has relied upon for years. That is, an attacker could use a QC to obtain private cryptographic keys from public keys quickly and efficiently. In 1996, Lov Kumar Grover furthermore showed that QCs could be used to solve the problem of linear search over an unsorted N-element space in O(√N) operations using a special diffusion operator that he developed. [2] For adversaries with a QC, Grover's algorithm implies the weakening of our symmetric key algorithms by proposing a more efficient way to search the space of possible keys in order to obtain the secret value. In 1999, Gilles Brassard et al. showed that QCs could be used to solve the problem of finding hash function collisions in O( 3 √N) operations using Grover's algorithm. [28] The implications of these surprising results to public and symmetric key cryptography are well-documented. Both the NSA/CSS IAD "Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite and Quantum Computing FAQ" of January 2016 [3] and the NIST "Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography" [4] of April 2016 call out the need for new standards to replace cryptosystems based on integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems. This includes replacing widely used RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, and DSA cryptosystems While symmetric key cryptography and secure hash functions are also impacted by the threat of quantum computing due to Grover's algorithm and the algorithm of Brassard et al., increasing key sizes and output sizes, respectively, is a well-understood approach to remediate.
Changes to key and hash output sizes, in practice, is highly impactful to widely deployed cryptography for data in motion and at rest and will require considerable engineering to make the transition. But our focus henceforth will be on research surrounding the newer and less understood problem of replacing our public key cryptography algorithms with quantum safe alternatives.
Additionally, many point out that implementing Grover's algorithm on QCs is expected to be difficult in practice due to long-running serial computations and the need for deep circuits. [19, 29] Note the important and clarifying distinction between Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) which are often confused. While PQC focuses on cryptographic algorithms that are resistant to QC attacks, QKD is a quantum technology for securely distributing shared cryptographic keys between two endpoints. QKD leverages the properties of quantum mechanics and is often implemented using polarized photons or entangled pairs of photons over fiber optics, although schemes also exist for free space. Technologies related to QKD include quantum communications which enables the exchange of qubits and entanglement between quantum computers, and quantum networks which looks at the use of quantum communications to connect multiple sites across larger geographic areas. Our focus here is on PQC which will be widely implemented on conventional computing systems as a safeguard against scaled QCs which are likely to exist in the future.
The Problem of PQC Migration: An Approaching Storm
While NIST's standardization effort is aimed squarely at the problem of determining which cryptographic algorithms are robust enough to provide safe alternatives for a post-QC world, there is another major challenge to consider: that of migrating our extensive infrastructure from today's widely deployed algorithms to PQC alternatives.
We argue that far from a mere "practical consideration", this migration is in need of extensive research as a companion domain.
Today, there are more than 4.1 billion Internet users, nearly 2 billion websites, and more than 3 trillion dollars in retail activity associated with the Internet.
[5] Underlying this explosive digital transformation of the world as we know A second concern is the time and complexity of PQC migration which implies the need for considerable lead time before scaled QCs are available. NIST acknowledges this as well, stating in their PQC call for proposals that "a transition to post-quantum cryptography will not be simple as there is unlikely to be a simple 'drop-in' replacement for our current public-key cryptographic algorithms." [19] This situation is further exacerbated in embedded environments and other settings dependent on cryptographic hardware. For instance, the chief of computer security at NIST remarked that "cryptographic agility is critical for small satellite security." [35] Such systems are hard to modify and are known for long-lived deployments.
Third is concern over the possibility of "record now, exploit later" (also known as "harvest now, decrypt later")
in which an adversary captures encrypted versions of long-lived private information assets (e.g., social security numbers, critical business information) for attack later when quantum computers become available. The threat implies the critical need for quantum safe protections within industry and government for long-lived information assets well in advance of a fully implemented threat.
Finally, there is an important need to explore PQC migration considerations during NIST's standardization process which is in full swing at the time of this writing.
Research will inform NIST's evaluation of PQC proposals and help to ensure that practical standards and parameter guidelines are selected.
The Need for Research
The complex challenge of migrating our global compute infrastructure to new public-key cryptography standards will involve work on many levels, and we argue that the area overall is in dire need of research. That is, before the global industry ecosystem can deploy quantum safe solutions, there is considerable work to be done understanding migration challenges and schemes, and more rigorously addressing integration, security, performance, agility, and other challenges. The research community, known for its analytic rigor and freedom to explore, is uniquely positioned to contribute in this space.
In particular, an interdisciplinary collaboration between cryptography, applied cryptography, and system security researchers is needed to understand this new and crosscutting domain.
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Core PQC Migration Challenges
The need for research in PQC migration begins with the need to understand the many contexts in which transition to new PQC algorithms will occur, and the problem of how migration will be implemented. This includes the problem of obsoleting deprecated algorithms, something that is surprisingly hard within a complicated world of deeply entrenched deployments and frameworks with little or no support for phased retirement.
By way of background, the five key families of PQC algorithms are shown in Figure 3 . Below we discuss several areas of PQC migration that could benefit from research.
PQC Algorithms: Charting Implications Across Domains
A core set of research challenges surrounds the need to understand and quantify the implications of replacing today's public cryptography algorithms (e.g., RSA, ECDH, ECDSA, DSA) with PQC alternatives (see Figure 3 ) across a wide variety of implementation and deployment contexts.
As mentioned by NIST, there are significant differences between PQC and our widely deployed public key cryptography standards. Most obvious are increases in key, ciphertext, and signature sizes which many of our current usage domains are not prepared to accommodate. 
Performance Considerations
Given that PQC algorithms generally have greater computation, memory, storage, and communication requirements (e.g., larger key sizes, more complex algorithms, or both), research is needed to better understand and quantify performance considerations in a wide range of deployment contexts. Broadly, performance is a key industry concern, and an important set of challenges to be solved before PQC can be adopted in practice. Techniques for making PQC more performant can also be applied to the challenge of hardware acceleration.
FPGA-based research could be used to explore accelerator designs for key memory and computation bottlenecks in various families of PQC algorithms. As seen over time with AES and SHA-2, hardware primitives could be designed that lead to new instruction proposals for widely used computer and communication architectures.
Security Considerations
Changes to the characteristics and requirements of our public key cryptography algorithms are more than just a matter of performance. They create new security issues in a variety of ways.
In contrast to well-understood RSA and ECC algorithms, for a broad spectrum of hardware platforms, from multisocket servers to widely used end user devices to rapidly proliferating IoT devices.
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Implementation Considerations
The implementation of cryptography, whether in software or hardware, is notoriously more difficult than it appears.
In part, this reflects the complexity of mathematical algorithms, which are a common source of errors. More fundamentally, however, it reflects the difficulty in translating mathematical algorithms to platform-specific architectures and device contexts. For example, the details of data representation and layout, and its interactions with a system's memory hierarchy and operating system buffering mechanisms, can introduce vulnerabilities that are not apparent within cryptographic algorithm design. within Open Quantum Safe [32] ) to support experimentation and performance characterization on specific platforms and using specific programming language runtimes.
Migration Frameworks: How will we get there?
Migration from today's widely used public key cryptography algorithms to PQC replacements is not merely about the algorithms. Another much-needed area of research surrounds the approaches used to introduce new algorithms within systems that must operate continuously and remain interoperable with other systems that may be ahead or behind on the migration curve.
One widely discussed approach to introducing migration is that of hybrid schemes. In this approach, two cryptographic algorithms are applied, one from our current canon of standards (e.g., RSA or ECC) and one from the newer array of PQC alternatives (e.g., lattices). Hybrids provide a way to introduce quantum safety to address "record now, exploit later" while still relying on well-understood resistance to classical attacks. This is especially important during The research question to be addressed is how algorithm deprecation can be "designed in" to a migration scheme to ensure deprecated algorithms don't operate in perpetuity. 
Complex Infrastructures
A New Science of Cryptographic Agility
The challenge of migrating our public key cryptography to quantum safe alternatives naturally raises broader questions about the very frameworks we use to deploy and configure cryptography across the global Internet. Even NIST's current work on PQC standardization is expected to lead to several alternatives for use with encryption, key encapsulation, and digital signatures. We outline what we see to be the research issues below.
Definitions, Goals, and Scope
What should an expanded and more rigorous science of A third step in broadening the scope of CA is to comprehend modalities of "agility" beyond simple algorithmic agility.
Workshop participants suggested the following additions:
Modality Scope
Implementation Agility Application interfaces and policy configuration frameworks facilitate migration across implementations.
Compliance Agility
Cryptographic infrastructure can be reconfigured to address compliance requirements for varying international regulations and frameworks, or to minimize a trusted computing base (TCB)
Security Strength Agility
Many PQC algorithms require different implementations for different security strengths.
Algorithms that dynamically ascale security strength based on configuration provide better agility
Migration Agility
The ability to move automatically from one scheme to another -including conversion.
Requires better use of cryptographic metadata at the level of application data.
Retirement Agility
The ability to enforce the retirement of obsoleted or insecure cryptographic algorithms.
Composability Agility
The ability to combine cryptographic building blocks in a secure way.
Platform agility
The ability to use assured cryptographic algorithms across different platform types.
Context Agility
The cryptographic algorithm and strength policy should ideally have the flexibility to be derived automatically from system attributes such as data classification and data location. Hybrid cryptography schemes were mentioned in section 2.2 as a way to migrate from one standard to another.
Essentially, two cryptographic algorithms are applied, one from our current canon of standards (e.g., RSA or ECC) and one from the newer array of PQC alternatives (e.g., lattices) as a way to introduce quantum safety while still relying on well-understood resistance to classical attacks. X.509v3 digital certificates were cited as a canonical example. [16] Agility research using hybrids (and cryptographic combiners) might consider their role as building blocks within a larger framework that addresses ongoing transitions over time. Perhaps the approach could be applied to agility contexts with other time scales (e.g., session-based, short-term vulnerability response), and variants of the scheme could be developed to address performance overheads and resource requirements, two key drawbacks cited earlier.
The existing practice of cipher suite negotiation, as seen in IETF protocols like TLS [18] , represents an important and widely used agility approach within the communication protocol domain, enough so to warrant an IETF RFC on the subject [14] . As described in section 2.2, a list of supported cipher suites is presented by interacting parties during the protocol's initial handshake phase in order to select the most robust option that both support. 
Security and Complexity Tradeoffs
An important concern and companion research issue in CA schemes is that of attack surfaces. It was mentioned in section 2.2 and 3.1.1 that IETF RFC 7696 ("Guidelines for
Cryptographic Algorithm Agility and Selecting Mandatoryto-Implement Algorithms") [14] offers a protocol-centric view of CA, defining a successful realization to be "when a protocol can easily migrate from one algorithm suite to another more desirable one, over time". The RFC describes numerous requirements for CA schemes, including standardized identifiers and version numbers for algorithm suites, specifications for which algorithms must be implemented, mandatory key sizes and parameter settings, integrity protections for algorithm negotiation, and more.
While CA as described may seem a panacea of sorts, a key concern mentioned in the RFC is that of added "Agility mechanisms introduce complexity, which leads to unknown consequences." [22] What are the adversarial implications of introducing CA mechanisms, and how might these considerations guide the design of particular mechanisms? In a related point, workshop participants pointed out the need to prevent CA schemes from enabling bad algorithms and malicious implementations for a given usage domain.
Other Defining Challenges
Workshop participants mentioned a number of additional research challenges. An important opportunity is context-aware CA schemes that could address notorious problems surrounding the users of cryptography. One of these is the failure of users to configure cryptographic systems with the right algorithms and parameters, something they often don't understand or ignore due to complexity or infrastructure scaling issues.
Automatic selection of defaults (algorithms, security levels, key sizes, etc.) is a simple but important example.
Another problem is that of cryptography evolution over 
Additional Research Directions
In this section, we discuss additional research challenges.
Policy, Process, People
While the technical challenges surrounding PQC migration and cryptographic agility are considerable, many workshop participants additionally pointed out that research is desperately needed to better understand people, process, and policy aspects of the problem. While technical solutions are essential, these determine whether or not adoption occurs at all and when. 
Frontiers of Cryptography
In addition to conventional cryptography use cases, workshop participants also discussed research challenges associated with emerging areas of cryptography. Below is a list of key areas. 
Conclusions
As quantum computing continues to make advancements in qubit technologies, scaling architectures, algorithms, applications, software tools, and more, it simultaneously fuels the urgency for a major transition in cryptography across the Internet as we know it today. At the time of this writing, NIST is actively leading an international community effort to select new public key cryptography algorithms for standardization to replace widely used RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, and DSA which are known to be vulnerable Finally, research is also needed on the frontiers of cryptography; that is, how PQC migration and cryptographic agility will apply to newer cryptography fields like secure multi-party computation, fully homomorphic encryption, blockchain, and more. This includes both how PQC migration and cryptographic agility will apply to each approach, and whether these developing cryptographic technologies can play a role in providing cryptographic agility and facilitating PQC migration.
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